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APPORTIONMENT OF DUAL-PURPOSE EXPENSES 
NICHOLAS AUGUSTINOS 
This article examines a particular type of dual-purpose expense – one which can 
be linked both to the derivation of assessable income and to the generation of a 
private benefit. On what basis should a taxpayer be able to claim a deduction for 
such an expense? Significant difficulty and uncertainty underlie the 
apportionment process that is applied to such an expense by the courts, the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the Australian Taxation Office. The 
process provides little practical guidance to taxpayers on how to apportion dual-
purpose expenses. In addition, a tension exists between the apportionment 
process and the threshold issue of characterisation or ‘relevance’ of dual-
purpose expenses. This article examines these issues and suggests some clear 
principles that should be applied to the task of deducting dual-purpose expenses 
of this kind. 
This article focuses on expenses that have a particular dual-purpose. On the one 
hand, the expense leads to gaining assessable income. On the other, the expense also 
generates a private benefit, such as the satisfaction of a personal consumption 
preference. For example, the payment of hotel accommodation for a taxpayer and his 
or her spouse where that accommodation has been arranged as part of overseas 
travel, that is both relevant to the taxpayer’s employment and the taxpayer and his or 
her spouse’s enjoyment. 
Given the expense has  a dual-purpose, should the taxpayer be entitled to claim a 
deduction for the entire expense? If the taxpayer should not be entitled to claim a 
deduction for the entire expense, on what basis should the taxpayer apportion the 
deduction? This article examines the decisions of the courts and the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’), as well as various Australian Taxation Office (‘ATO’) 
rulings, to ascertain whether these precedents offer any practical guidance to 
taxpayers on how to apportion this kind of dual-purpose expense. The article finds 
that apportionment, as applied by the courts and the AAT, is a very loose and 
subjective process which offers little, if any, practical guidance to taxpayers on how 
to apportion dual-purpose expenses. At best, certain underlying principles, which 
offer some general guidance to taxpayers on how to apportion, can be extracted from 
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these decisions. There is an obvious need for greater clarity in the enunciation of 
these principles by the courts and the AAT. 
In the context of dual-purpose expenses, a clear inconsistency exists between 
apportionment as applied by the courts, the AAT and the ATO and 
apportionment as recommended by the late Professor RW Parsons in his text 
Income Taxation in Australia. In Parsons’ view, a tension exists between the 
apportionment process and the threshold issue of characterisation or ‘relevance’ 
of dual-purpose expenses. He consistently points out,  ‘apportionment ought not 
to be used as a way of expressing a doubt about relevance’.1 This article looks at 
a number of apportionment decisions of the courts and the AAT in light of this 
recommendation and suggests certain key questions requiring further 
consideration and clarification.2 Should we accept the Parsons approach? If we 
do, we cut-through a significant part of the administrative difficulty underlying 
the apportionment process as currently applied to dual-purpose expenses. 
Section 8-1 ITAA97 
According to sub-section 8-1(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) 
(‘ITAA97’), a loss or outgoing is deductible ‘to the extent that it is incurred in gaining 
or producing assessable income’. Sub-section 8-1(2)(b) provides ‘you cannot deduct a 
loss or outgoing under this section to the extent that it is a loss or outgoing of a 
private or domestic nature’. How are these sub-sections to be applied to the relevant 
dual-purpose expenses considered in this article? In particular, in the context of dual-
purpose expenses, how are the words ‘to the extent that’ to be interpreted? An 
ordinary, prima facie reading of these sub-sections suggests that apportionment only 
is required, as the apportionment process itself should identify that part of the dual-
purpose expense that is linked to the derivation of assessable income and should 
separate expenses that generate the private benefit. A deduction could thus be 
granted for the expense linked to the derivation of assessable income. Therefore, in 
applying s 8-1 to dual-purpose expenses, the application of the High Court decision 
in Ronpibon Tin (1949) 78 CLR 47 (discussed below) provides our apportionment 
methodology. 
                                                                
1  RW Parsons, Income Taxation in Australia (Lawbook Co, Sydney, 1985) 8.51, 8.85, 8.88 and 
9.11. 
2  Professor Parsons’ comments were made in 1985 and many of the cases considered in this 
article were decided at a later date. Nevertheless, despite the constantly developing 
nature of Australian tax law, it is appropriate to revisit the views put forward by 
Professor Parsons, which remain relevant to the on-going development of tax policy 
concerning the apportionment of dual-purpose expenditure. 
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The application of s 8-1 to dual-purpose outgoings, however, is not such a simple 
matter. Section 8-1 follows closely the language previously used in s 51(1) of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and the cases and academic commentary 
considering that section are relevant. According to Parsons,3 in the context of dual-
purpose expenses, s 51(1) does not raise an issue of apportionment alone. A separate 
issue of characterisation or ‘relevance’ of the expense must also be considered.  
Relevance4 
A consideration of the apportionment of a dual-purpose outgoing does not occur in a 
vacuum.  Consideration must take place in the context of a characterisation of the 
dual-purpose outgoing. Is the outgoing properly characterised as expenditure 
‘wholly or partly incurred in gaining or producing assessable income?’5  Parsons 
makes clear that the process of characterising outgoings is separate to apportionment. 
According to Parsons,6 
It is the view of this Volume that where an issue is raised as to the relevance of 
an expense, a decision to compromise by apportioning and allowing a deduction 
of part of the expense is not appropriate. In circumstances such as Magna Alloys 
& Research Pty Ltd (1980) 80 ATC 4542, if the board of directors is moved in part 
by a purpose of conferring a gratuitous benefit on the officers of the company – a 
benefit that is not a reward for services – it is not appropriate to allow a 
deduction of some part of the expense. A decision must be made as to the whole 
                                                                
3  Ibid 8.85. 
4  For further discussion on relevance and characterisation of outgoings see: R H Woellner, 
S Barkoczy, S Murphy, C Evans and D Pinto, Australian Taxation Law (CCH, 22nd ed, 2012) 
chapter 10; P Burgess, G S Cooper, M Stewart and R J Vann, Cooper, Krever & Vann’s 
Income Taxation Commentary and Materials (Thomson Reuters, 7th ed, 2012) chapter 7; 
LexisNexis Halsbury’s Laws of Australia (at 29 February 2012) 405 Taxation and Revenue, 
IV Tax Deductions, (2) General Tax Deduction Provision [405-8085] – [405-8110]; E J Teo, 
‘Australia’s Largest Tax Case Revisited: A Nail in the Coffin for the Objective Approach 
to Determining the Deductibility of Expenses’ (2005) 8 Journal of Australian Taxation 2, 328; 
A Blaikie, ‘Section 8-1: making certain that you receive what you are entitled to’ (Paper 
presented at the Taxation Institute of Australia National Division Conference, 6 April 
2006); M Friezer, ‘Tax Forum: Manouevring the Maze – Update on Section 8-1’ (Paper 
presented at the Taxation Institute of Australia NSW Division Conference, 24 May 2007); 
G O’Shaughnessy and M Clough, ‘Case Law Developments in Section 8-1’ (Paper 
presented at the Taxation Institute of Australia VIC Division Conference, 8-10 October 
2009); M Friezer, ‘Update on Deductibility Under Section 8-1’ (Paper presented at the 
Taxation Institute of Australia NSW Division Conference, 18 May 2010). 
5  Fletcher v FCT (1991) 173 CLR 1, 17. 
6  Parsons, above n 1, 9.11. 
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expense. An apportionment would simply express a doubt about relevance: it 
would not identify an element within the expense that is relevant to income 
derivation. 
This comment makes it clear that, in Parsons’ view, when dealing with a dual-
purpose expense, we should not be quick to apply an apportionment process and 
grant a deduction for only part of the expense. The question of relevance must first be 
determined by assessing the expense as a whole. Is the whole of the expense 
regarded as relevant to income derivation? 
Although this is the approach that Parsons suggests should be adopted in principle, 
it is interesting to note that in many AAT and Board of Review decisions considered 
for the purposes of this article, this approach was not implemented.7 When faced 
with dual-purpose expenses the tribunal did not first assess the relevance of the 
expense as a whole but simply made a determination on apportionment. In some 
instances, this approach was taken because relevance had already been conceded by 
the Commissioner and this left apportionment as the only matter to be ruled upon.8 
Only in the case of Pitcher v DFC of T 98 ATC 2190 did Senior Member Block refer to 
the Parsons approach.9  
Despite the lack of implementation in tribunal decisions, if we follow the Parsons 
approach, a critical question would arise. Given that the expense clearly has a private 
benefit as one of its purposes, in what circumstances should we regard the expense as 
having been incurred wholly or partly in gaining or producing assessable income? 
From a logical perspective, the relevance threshold is satisfied only if out of the two 
purposes served by the expense it is the derivation of assessable income that 
constitutes the dominant purpose of the expense.10 In the majority of AAT and Board 
of Review decisions considered in this article, the question of dominant purpose of 
the dual-purpose expense was not considered. However, these decisions did not 
distinguish (or were not required to distinguish) the relevance question from the 
                                                                
7  See, for instance, Case U5 87 ATC 124 and Case S12 85 ATC 165 and the decisions referred 
to under the section headed ‘Apportionment Cases’. 
8  Case R2 84 ATC 106, Case V15 88 ATC 177 and Case S80 85 ATC 589. 
9  98 ATC 2190, 2196. Although Senior Member Block referred to Parsons, he made it clear 
that to the best of his knowledge there were no judicial pronouncements which favoured 
the propositions advanced by Parsons. Accordingly, he did not follow previous 
precedents when making his decision. 
10  Parsons applies a dominant purpose test when considering the relevance of dual-purpose 
professional/entertainment expenses, Parsons, above n 1, 8.85. 
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apportionment question. Only in  Re Peter Lenten and Pitcher, the AAT referred to a 
dominant purpose test in the assessment of the question of relevance.11  
Apart from these AAT decisions, there is some limited guidance from the Australian 
Taxation Office. In taxation ruling TR 92/8,12 some consideration is given to the 
apportionment of self-education expenses when they serve both the purpose of 
gaining or producing income and an incidental private purpose. Paragraph 36 of the 
ruling makes clear that, 
when determining the characterisation issue for self education expenses, we 
believe that it is, at the least, a relevant matter to consider whether a non 
income-producing purpose was the dominant purpose for the incurring of the 
expenses. 
The understanding that the relevance of dual-purpose expenses should be assessed 
according to their dominant purpose is contradicted by the Federal Court case of FCT 
v Studdert (1991) 33 FCR 75. That case involved a Qantas flight engineer who sought a 
deduction for expenses incurred on light aircraft flying lessons leading to a private 
pilot’s licence. Hill J found that the expenses had a dual purpose. On the one hand, 
the taxpayer undertook the lessons to become better equipped to perform his skilled 
job as a flight engineer leading to promotion and increased income. On the other 
hand, the lessons were undertaken with a view to a possible application for 
retraining as a flight officer. The first purpose was clearly linked to the derivation of 
assessable income. The second purpose was a non income-producing purpose. 
According to Hill J, in determining the essential character of the expenses,13 it is 
irrelevant whether the second purpose is dominant or not. As long as one of the 
purposes of the expenses relates to the derivation of income, that is enough to resolve 
the characterisation issue.14  
                                                                
11  Re Peter Lenten and Commissioner of Taxation AAT [2008] BC200802369 [34]; Pitcher v DFC 
of T 98 ATC 2190 2197. 
12  Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Deductibility of Self Education Expenses, TR 1992/8, 
17 September 1992. Although TR 92/8 has been withdrawn and replaced by TR 98/9 
(Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Deductibility of Self-Education Expenses Incurred by 
an Employee or a Person in Business, TR 1998/9, 17 June 1998), the comments made on the 
characterisation issue are of particular relevance to the discussion in this section of the 
article. 
13  The question of whether an expense (dual-purpose or otherwise) has sufficient nexus to 
the derivation of assessable income is determined by application of an ‘essential 
character’ test. This article aims to highlight, however, that there is a problem in the way 
nexus issues are determined by the courts and the AAT in a dual-purpose context.  
14  33 FCR 75, 80-81. 
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We are therefore faced with two possible options when assessing the relevance of 
dual-purpose expenses. One option is to adopt Hill J’s approach, regarding the 
relevance threshold as being satisfied by the mere fact that one of the purposes of the 
expense relates to the derivation of income. The other option is to apply a dominant 
purpose test, regarding the expense as being relevant only if the derivation of 
assessable income constitutes the dominant purpose. In the context of dual-purpose 
expenses, it is the dominant purpose test which is more consistent with the approach 
recommended by Parsons of assessing the relevance of the whole expense.15 
In TR 92/8, the ATO points out that it is not convinced by Hill J’s approach. 
According to the ATO,16  
to the extent that his Honour might be interpreted as suggesting that, when 
determining the characterisation issue for self education expenses, it is irrelevant 
to consider whether a non income-producing purpose was the dominant 
purpose for the incurring of the expenses, we believe that that view is not 
supported by Fletcher & Ors v FCT’. Fletcher & Ors 173 CLR 1 is a High Court 
decision and would clearly override Studdert.  
According to the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, 
Gaudron and McHugh JJ (173 CLR 1, 17-18): 
 In that regard and in the context of the sub-section’s clear contemplation of 
apportionment, statements in the cases to the effect that it is sufficient for the 
purposes of s. 51(1) that the production of assessable income is “the occasion” of 
the outgoing or that the outgoing is a “cost of a step taken in the process of 
gaining or producing income” are to be understood as referring to a genuine and 
not colourable relationship between the whole of the expenditure and the 
production of such income. 
This extract from the joint judgment in Fletcher & Ors confirms the High Court’s 
support for an approach that considers the relevance of the whole expense.  The ATO 
argues however, that the judgment also supports the application of a dominant-
purpose test when assessing the relevance of dual-purpose expenses. This argument 
is not entirely convincing as the joint judgment acknowledges that the question of 
‘dominant purpose’ was not explored before the High Court.17 It is submitted that 
this issue awaits further clarification in a subsequent decision.18  
                                                                
15  Parsons, above n 1, 8.85. 
16  TR 92/8, above n 12, 35. 
17  173 CLR 1, 24. 
18  The application of a dominant purpose test in the context of a relevance assessment 
relates to the ‘legal right approach/purposive approach’ question discussed in R H 
Woellner (et al), above n 4, [10-210] and in P Burgess (et al), above n 4, [7.430].  It is the 
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The court and tribunal decisions examined in this article reveal that deductibility 
involves a two-stage process (whereby relevance and apportionment are considered 
as separate issues). This principle is very much the settled orthodoxy. Parsons, 
however, argues that, even in the case of dual-purpose expenses, apportionment does 
not follow relevance. If the expense is found to be relevant, then the expense is 
deducted in full.19 If it is not relevant, no deduction is granted at all. Also in Studdert, 
no question of apportionment arose.20 Hill J allowed a deduction for the entire dual-
purpose expense having found the expense to be relevant.21 So where does that leave 
Ronpibon Tin and the process of apportionment? The overwhelming majority of court 
and tribunal decisions which are the focus of this article have purportedly followed 
the Ronpibon Tin precedent and apportioned dual-purpose expenses. There is, 
however, an inconsistency between how Ronpibon Tin has been applied by the courts 
and tribunals and how Parsons recommends that this case should be applied. That 
inconsistency is explored in more detail in the next section of this article. 
Principles of Apportionment and the Apportionment Process22 
The principle of apportionment, which underlies s 8-1 of the ITAA97, was interpreted 
in the High Court case of Ronpibon Tin NL v FCT: 
there are at least two kinds of items of expenditure that require apportionment. 
One kind consists in undivided items of expenditure in respect of things or 
services of which distinct and severable parts are devoted to gaining or 
                                                                                                                                                                       
view of this article that the legal right approach/purposive approach question arises in 
the context of a different type of dual purpose expense – one where the dual-purpose 
relates to the realisation of an apparent benefit (the derivation of taxable income) and a 
tax benefit (a reduction in the taxes ultimately payable). Whilst the ‘legal right 
approach/purposive approach’ distinction can be drawn in the context of an assessable 
income/tax minimisation dual-purpose expense, it does not translate to an analysis of the 
assessable income/private benefit dual-purpose expenses which are the focus of this 
article.  
19  Parsons, above n 1, 9.2, 8.85 and 8.51. 
20  33 FCR 75, 76. 
21  Hill J clearly acknowledges that a deduction for the entire dual-purpose expense should 
not be denied even where the non-income producing purpose is dominant (33 FCR 75, 
80). 
22  For further discussion on apportionment and the apportionment process see: R H 
Woellner (et al), above n 4, 10-200; P Burgess (et al), above n 4, 7.410; K Sadiq (et al), 
Principles of Taxation Law (Thomson Reuters, 5th ed, 2012), 12.270; Australian Master Tax 
Guide ( CCH, 51st ed, 2012) 16-070fj; J W Durack, ‘Deductions for Personal Expenditure – 
Having your Cake and Eating it Too’ (1994) 23 Australian Tax Review 205; D Lockie and W 
Ngo, ‘Apportionment of Deductions Post FCofT v Firth’ (2002) 5 The Tax Specialist 5 , 254. 
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producing assessable income and distinct and severable parts to some other 
cause. In such cases it may be possible to divide the expenditure in accordance 
with the applications which have been made of the things or services. The other 
kind of apportionable items consists in those involving a single outlay or charge 
which serves both objects indifferently. Of this directors’ fees may be an 
example. With the latter kind there must be some fair and reasonable assessment 
of the extent of the relation of the outlay to assessable income. It is an 
indiscriminate sum apportionable, but hardly capable of arithmetical or rateable 
division because it is common to both objects. In such a case the result must 
depend in an even greater degree upon a finding by the tribunal of fact.23 
Based on this statement from the High Court, a few general conclusions can be 
drawn on assessing the deductibility of dual-purpose outgoings. The first step is to 
work out whether the outgoing comes within the first or the second kind of 
apportionable outgoing, as identified in Ronpibon Tin. The second step is to apply the 
relevant apportionment process which corresponds to each kind of apportionable 
outgoing. 
For the first kind of apportionable outgoing, the apportionment process can be 
applied with relative precision. The apportionment process is simply a matter of 
dividing the expense and ‘tracing’ those parts linked to the generation of assessable 
income. An example of such an apportionable outgoing would be the cost of a mobile 
phone which is used for both private and business purposes. As detailed records are 
kept of the cost of individual calls, it would be possible (and, perhaps, not too 
impractical) to extract from a monthly mobile phone bill that part which relates to 
income generation and to allow a deduction for that part of the total cost.24  
Where the separate outgoing is relevant to the derivation of assessable income, it 
would be deductible in full. According to Parsons, this outcome was available under 
the general deduction section of the ITAA36, even without the addition of the phrase 
‘to the extent to which’. 25 
It is the second kind of apportionable outgoing identified in Ronpibon Tin, where the 
inconsistency between the approach of the courts and tribunals considered in this 
article and the approach of Parsons potentially arises. This outgoing concerns a single 
outlay which serves two objects (the gaining of assessable income and some other 
cause) indifferently.  For this category, the High Court provides guidance that the 
                                                                
23  (1949) 78 CLR 47, 59. 
24  Mobile telephone costs were considered in Pitcher v DFC of T 98 ATC 2190. 
25  Parsons, above n 1, 9.4. 
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apportionment should be based on a ‘fair and reasonable assessment of the extent of 
the relation of the outlay to assessable income’26. 
The apportionment process applied in the second scenario is a ‘rough and ready 
process’, whereby different apportionment methods producing different results may 
be equally acceptable.27 It essentially involves a factual determination to be 
conducted by the tribunal of fact, with the tribunal having significant flexibility in 
achieving its overriding objective, namely, the application of an apportionment that 
is ‘just’ or ‘fair and reasonable’. 
What is Parsons’ position on this process? Apart from highlighting the underlying 
administrative difficulty, he recommends that the process should not be applied in 
such a way that a ‘doubt about relevance’ of the expense might be raised. Using the 
example of directors fees (as did the High Court in Ronpibon), he notes that no doubt 
about relevance arises because ‘it is none the less possible to contemplate a separate 
payment being made to directors for work that is relevant to the derivation of income 
by the company and a separate payment for work that is not’.28 Similarly, at [8.51] he 
argues that ‘the approach to apportionment of an expense suggested in [9.11] below 
is that it is proper only when a separate outgoing could have been made to serve the 
purpose that would give the expense relevance’. 
From Parsons’ perspective, apportionment in the second scenario is only appropriate 
when, although the expense serves two objects indifferently (and is incapable of 
‘arithmetical or rateable division’), the expense could have been split into separate 
relevant and non-relevant outgoings, with a full deduction being granted for the 
relevant outgoing.  Parsons therefore appears to apply a hypothetical construct to the 
application of apportionment under the second scenario, which seeks to achieve an 
outcome which is the same as that achieved by apportionment in the first scenario. 
There is no ‘partial’ relevance for deductions according to Parsons. 
In many cases considered for the purposes of this article, it appears that, in the name 
of Ronpibon Tin, the tribunal is willing to apportion the expense and grant a minor 
deduction even where derivation of a private benefit constitutes the dominant 
purpose of the expense.29 In doing so, the tribunal is potentially applying a concept of 
‘partial’ relevance, which raises doubt about the relevance of the overall expense. 
                                                                
26  Ronpibon Tin NL v FCT (1949) 78 CLR 47, 59-60. 
27  Handley v FC of T (1981) 148 CLR 182, 193 (Stephen J). 
28  Parsons, above n 1, 9.12. 
29  See for instance Re Peter Lenten and Commissioner of Taxation, AAT unreported judgment, 
[2008], BC200802369; Case S12 85 ATC 165; Case U5 87 ATC 124. 
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How do we deal with this problem? A possible answer is to follow the Parsons 
approach and apply a dominant purpose test to settle both the relevance and 
apportionment issues.30 Under this approach, where the purpose of deriving 
assessable income is dominant, there should be no apportionment and the entire 
expense should be deductible. Alternatively, where generation of a private benefit 
dominates, there should be no apportionment and the entire expense should be held 
to be non-deductible. The simplicity of such an approach cuts through a significant 
part of the administrative difficulty underlying the apportionment process as 
currently applied to dual-purpose expenses. An initial evaluation is conducted below 
under the heading ‘Apportionment Cases’ by analysing the approach taken by the 
AAT and the Courts to the question of apportionment in the context of the following 
categories of dual-purpose expenses:31 
1. Home office/study; 
2. Clothing; 
3. Telephone; 
4. Hotel and other accommodation (application of the ‘marginal cost’ 
approach); 
                                                                
30  Parsons, above n1, 8.85. 
31  The categories of expense considered were derived from extensive case and ruling 
research on the question of apportionment of partially private expenses. While the 
discussion on the clothing category is based on cases involving somewhat unique fact 
circumstances, these cases nevertheless provide a useful insight into how the 
apportionment process is applied by the courts and the AAT. Of the remaining 
categories, the discussion on home office, telephone and recreational expenses would be 
highly relevant to tax practitioners. As the ATO audit processes have noted that tax 
returns which claim deductions in these categories often fail to provide a ‘reasonable’ 
basis for the claimed deductible percentage of relevant expenditure. See, eg, ‘Why tax 
agent returns are returned’ (1997) 31 Taxation in Australia 7.  Interest expenses, as 
considered  in Fletcher v FCT 173 CLR 1 and in Ure v FCT  (1981) 50 FLR 219, are not given 
further attention in this section of the article, as they do not come within the particular 
type of dual-purpose expense which is the focus of this article. These interest expense 
cases concern the application of an apportionment process in a scenario where the 
interest outgoing leads to the derivation of both assessable and exempt income or leads to 
the obtaining of a tax deduction, so that the amount of assessable income generated is less 
than the amount of the outgoings. This is different to the dual-purpose expense types 
considered in this article where the expense can be linked to both the derivation of 
assessable income and to the generation of a private benefit (such as the satisfaction of a 
personal consumption preference). 
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5. Professional vs recreational expenses; and 
6. Self-education expenses – taxation ruling TR 98/9. 
Apportionment cases 
Home office/study32 
The typical fact scenario concerns a taxpayer who is required to carry out work 
duties through a home office or study. It is not merely for the convenience of the 
taxpayer that the home office or study is used for work purposes. As work 
requirements impose the use of the home office or study, the question arises which 
deductions the taxpayer can claim in respect of various costs incurred on the home 
such as rent or mortgage interest, insurance, rates, heating, cooling and lighting. 
These payments appear to constitute dual-purpose outgoings as they are incurred in 
generating assessable income (through the use of the home office for work purposes) 
as well as in respect of personal consumption (the provision of domestic 
accommodation). Despite the fact that personal consumption clearly constitutes the 
dominant purpose of the relevant payment, in Swinford, Lyons and Case U65, the 
payment was apportioned and a deduction was allowed for part of the expense. 
Deductions of significantly less than 50% of the total expense were allowed in each 
instance. 
An approach that tests the overall relevance of the expense does not really apply in 
these cases. As noted by Parsons, there is a distinction between a home that is 
‘business premises’ and a home used for ‘business purposes’. 33 As work 
requirements impose the use of the home office or study, the position of the taxpayer 
is similar to that of a doctor who maintains a surgery at home. Therefore, the surgery 
constitutes a place of business rather than part of the home. The work done out of the 
home office/study is beyond any notion of domestic use of the premises and ‘shelter 
expenses will be deductible to the extent that they are fairly attributable to the area of 
the home used, and the time devoted to that work’. The cases provide that the 
taxpayer should be regarded as having made separate payments of mortgage interest 
(or rent), insurance and rates in connection with the home office/study which should 
be treated as fully relevant and deductible.34 We apply the Ronpibon Tin 
                                                                
32  Handley v FC of T (1980) 42 FLR 125; Swinford v FC of T [1984] 3 NSWLR 118; Lyons v FC of 
T 99 ATC 2258; Case U65 87 ATC 415; Re Ovens v C of T, AAT unreported judgment, 
[2009], BC200901514. 
33  Parsons, above n 1, [8.35]. 
34  See for instance Case U65 87 ATC 415, 422. 
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apportionment process in order to identify, as far as reasonably possible, these 
separate payments. 
The underlying apportionment principle applied in these cases involves identifying 
how much extra is being paid by the taxpayer because the taxpayer is required to 
carry out work duties through a home office/study and then allowing a deduction for 
that extra amount.35 This involves a calculation of the proportion of floor space 
attributable to the income generation purpose and a calculation of the time 
attributable to income generation as a proportion of the total time in which the 
relevant home office area is used for both income generation and domestic purposes. 
The total deduction which the taxpayer can claim for various residence costs such as 
mortgage interest (or rent), rates and insurance is a factor of both these calculations.36 
What of the cost of heating, cooling and lighting? It is interesting to note that the 
Commissioner concedes a deduction for such costs where professional work is 
conducted out of a home office and where there is a nexus between that work and 
assessable income generation. The taxpayer is entitled to deduct the difference 
between the total cost paid for heating, cooling and lighting and the cost that would 
have been paid for these items had the taxpayer not worked from home.37 This is not 
an easy figure to calculate.38  
Clothing 
In most cases, expenditure on conventional clothing will not be deductible. The 
federal court case of Edwards (1993) 119 ALR 375 and taxation ruling TR 94/2239 
(which was issued in response to Edwards), however, confirm that there may be some 
instances where there is a direct nexus between conventional clothing expenditure 
and the derivation of assessable income. These instances require an apportionment of 
the expenditure and the granting of a deduction of part of the expense; for example, 
                                                                
35  See for instance Lyons v FC of T 99 ATC 2258, 2259. 
36  Handley v FC of T (1980) 42 FLR 125, 127 (Yeldham J). 
37  This concession was made by the Commissioner in Lyons v FC of T 99 ATC 2258; the 
suggested deduction is also referred to in TR 93/30, [23]; deductions for home office 
running costs were allowed by the AAT in Re Ovens v C of T, AAT unreported judgment, 
[2009], BC200901514. 
38  In TR 93/30, [24] the Commissioner provides a formula for calculating this figure for an 
appliance: (a) x (b) x (c) where (a) is the cost per unit of power used, (b) is the average 
units used per hour and (c) is the total annual hours used for income producing 
purposes. 
39  Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Implications of the Edwards Case for the Deductibility 
of Expenditure on Conventional Clothing by Employees, TR 1994/22, 23 June 1994. 
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where the nature of the taxpayer’s employment is such that the taxpayer is regularly 
required to attend public engagements in formal attire. Other examples are given in 
TR 94/22.40 
Neither the case of Edwards nor TR 94/22 make mention that the relevance of 
conventional clothing expenses is to be assessed according to a dominant purpose 
test. The dominant purpose of the clothing acquired does not have to be work related 
in order for the deduction to be granted. As long as there is a direct nexus between 
the expense and the derivation of assessable income, the expense can be apportioned 
and a deduction granted for part of the expense.41 
According to TR 94/22 (para 10), a reasonable estimate of work use relative to private 
use of the clothing should be applied. The case of Edwards confirms, however, that it 
is impractical to apply this approach to a large volume of clothing. In that case, the 
court applied a principle which is similar to that referred to above in respect of the 
home office/study. The court compared overall clothing expenses incurred during a 
period that the taxpayer was not subject to those demands with  expenses which 
were incurred during a period in which the work demands applied.42 
Again, the question arises – when looking at the whole expense; do we have a 
relevance problem if we apportion the expense and grant a deduction for part of the 
expense? The clothing scenarios considered in Edwards and TR 94/22 could 
potentially be viewed as being similar in their outcome to the home office/study 
scenario considered in Swinford, Lyons and Case U65. The use of the clothing is 
specifically imposed by work requirements. It could be argued that the clothing, 
although conventional, is ‘work clothing’. Should we treat this clothing as being 
beyond any personal use? It is difficult to contemplate separate deductible payments 
being made for the use of conventional clothing for work requirements when the 
same clothing is predominantly used for personal purposes. From a policy 
perspective, it would be simpler to apply a dominant purpose test to the clothing and 
allow a deduction for the entire expense if the conventional clothing is 
predominantly used for work purposes. 
                                                                
40  Refer to TR 94/22, [27]-[31].  
41  In Edwards, Gummow J applied the essential character test in determining that a sufficient 
nexus existed between the clothing expenses and the production of assessable income 
(119 ALR 375, 380-383). Gummow J’s decision was affirmed on appeal by the full Federal 
Court (49 FCR 318). 
42  FC of T v Edwards (1993) 119 ALR 375, 383 (Gummow J). Gummow J in fact approved the 
apportionment basis which had been applied by the AAT (93 ATC 359). 
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Clothing expenses were also considered in the Federal Court case of Morris v 
Commissioner of Taxation.43 In his judgment, Goldberg J acknowledges that he is 
dealing with dual-purpose expenses. Having decided that the sun-protection 
expenses under consideration were relevant to the derivation of assessable income, 
Goldberg J determined that the expenses should be apportioned to reflect the mixed 
work use/personal use. In his judgment Goldberg J makes comments such as,  ’I am 
satisfied there is a real connection between Ms Boydell’s income-producing activities 
and part of her expenditure of $30 in respect of her acquisition of sunglasses’ (at 
[131]);  ‘I am satisfied therefore that a proportion of Ms Boydell’s expenditure on the 
sunglasses is incidental and relevant to her occupation as a teacher of maritime 
studies’ (at [132]);  ‘The eighth applicant, Stephen Douglas Fennell. I am satisfied that 
a proportion of the expenditure of $25 claimed as a deduction in respect of his 
purchase of sunglasses is incidental and relevant to his occupation as a district 
operator with Energy Australia’ (at [138]).  In each instance, given the indissectibility 
of the outlay, the question arises - what of the relevance of the total expense? The 
application of a dominant purpose approach, as recommended by Fletcher and 
Parsons, helps to resolve this problem by treating the entire expense as relevant and 
deductible where the purpose of deriving assessable income dominates.  
Goldberg J’s decision expressly reflects the ‘partial relevance’ problem highlighted by 
Parsons. Whilst the Commissioner challenged the expenditures considered in the 
case on the basis that they were not incidental or relevant to the production of 
assessable income (as they were essentially of a private nature), he did not contest the 
taxpayers’ work use/personal use estimates. The taxpayers had claimed that the 
expenses were relevant and fully deductible, whilst the Commissioner claimed that 
the expenses were not deductible at all (at [72] to [77]). No one claimed that the 
expenses should be apportioned if found to be relevant. It was Goldberg J who 
imposed this outcome on the understanding that deductibility is a two-stage process, 
whereby the question of relevance is first considered (by applying tests such as the  
‘essential character’ test) and if the relevance threshold is satisfied, an apportionment 
of the expense then follows.  Accordingly, Goldberg J applied the taxpayers’ work-
use/personal use estimates when directing how the deductions should be 
apportioned and calculated upon reconsideration by the Commissioner.  
Telephone44 
As detailed records are kept of telephone calls (both for landline phones and mobile 
phones), it is not too difficult a process to identify which calls are work-related and 
                                                                
43  [2002] FCA 616. 
44  Pitcher v DFC of T 98 ATC 2190; Case R2 84 ATC 106. 
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which calls are private and to thereby calculate the extent to which a phone has been 
used in gaining assessable income.  
What about the cost of a mobile phone handset or the rental of a land line which is 
used for both work-related and private purposes?  In Board of Review Case R2 it was 
suggested by Member Beck that if you need the phone to carry on business, you can 
deduct the entire cost.45  
Member Beck did not specifically  apply a dominant purpose test in finding that the 
relevance threshold was satisfied and that the handset cost or line rental should be 
deductible in full. The mere existence of an income producing purpose appears to 
have been sufficient for Member Beck to find that the whole amount was 
deductible.46 
Hotel and other accommodation (application of the ‘marginal cost’ approach?)47 
The typical fact scenario concerns a taxpayer who travels overseas for work-related 
purposes (such as attending a conference or conducting research) and is 
accompanied by his or her spouse with the intention that the overseas travel also be 
used as a holiday. A question arises as to the deduction which can be claimed by the 
taxpayer for hotel or other accommodation which the taxpayer shares with his or her 
spouse during the time spent abroad.  
Taxpayers under this scenario often apply an ‘economic model’ in calculating the 
deduction. In the case of hotel accommodation, the taxpayer claims a deduction for 
the entire cost of the accommodation, less the additional charge levied by the hotel 
for accommodating a second person in the room. For other accommodation, the 
taxpayer argues that, as the cost of the accommodation is fixed regardless of whether 
the apartment is used by one or more persons, the taxpayer should be entitled to 
claim the entire cost as a deduction. Both these claims are rejected by the ATO which 
considers that actual use of the accommodation is shared between the taxpayer and 
his or her spouse. Consequently, the ATO apportions the accommodation deduction 
on a 50/50 basis.48 
The taxpayer’s claims under this scenario reflect a ‘marginal cost’ approach. Under 
this approach, the objective is to identify the marginal cost increase incurred as a 
result of the spouse’s presence. Hotel accommodation is readily identifiable and 
                                                                
45  84 ATC 106, 118. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Case V15 88 ATC 177; Case R2 84 ATC 106; Case S80 85 ATC 589. 
48  Case V15 88 ATC 177, 179. 
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corresponds to the additional charge imposed by the hotel for dual occupancy. In the 
case of other accommodation (such as a residential apartment), the marginal cost 
corresponds to zero as there is no cost increase occasioned by the spouse’s presence.49 
Although the marginal cost approach was approved by the Board of Review in Case 
R2, it was rejected in Case V15 and Case S80. A number of criticisms of this approach 
can be made. First, in the case of a taxpayer and spouse using accommodation, both 
occupants share equally in the facilities and there is no logical basis for determining 
which of the occupants should bear only the marginal cost.50 Second, the marginal 
cost approach involves a claim for a deduction which relies on a hypothetical 
situation, namely, that the taxpayer incurred accommodation costs just for himself or 
herself.51 However, the accommodation costs are incurred for the taxpayer and his or 
her spouse. FCT v Western Suburbs Cinemas (1952) 86 CLR 102 confirms that a notional 
deduction is not permissible.52 
The underlying principle to be extracted from the cases concerning accommodation is 
that the accommodation expense should be apportioned on the basis of the 
taxpayer’s share of the actual use made of the apartment and not on the basis of a 
marginal cost approach. 
The scenario considered in this section of the discussion raises an interesting issue 
regarding the threshold question of relevance. If a dominant purpose test is applied, 
it is clear that the threshold will not be satisfied. Given that the taxpayer and spouse 
share equally in the use of the accommodation, there is no basis to argue that the 
dominant purpose of the expense is the gaining of assessable income. The expense 
serves two purposes equally – the taxpayer’s work-related purpose and the spouse’s 
holiday purpose. Nevertheless, applying Ronpibon Tin, the tribunal and the 
Commissioner are willing to apportion the expense and grant a deduction on a 50/50 
basis. 
Professional vs recreational expenses53 
This scenario concerns professional expenses which also have an incidental 
recreational benefit. Examples include overseas travel to various historical sites by 
history teachers and the purchase of magazines and newspapers by teachers from 
                                                                
49  Case V15 88 ATC 177, 184. 
50  This criticism was made in Case R2 by Member Beck, 84 ATC 106, 119. 
51  Case S80 85 ATC 589, 594 (Member Stevens) and 596 (Member McCarthy). 
52  This argument is also supported by Parsons, above n 1, 9.12. 
53  Re Peter Lenten and Commissioner of Taxation [2008] BC200802369; Case S12 85 ATC 165; 
Case U5 87 ATC 124. 
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which classroom teaching material is extracted. The tribunal decisions in this 
category confirm that the expense must be apportioned and the deduction claimed 
must be reduced to take into account the incidental recreational benefit. No guidance 
is provided to taxpayers as to how that incidental recreational benefit might be 
gauged and calculated. The only underlying principle which might be extracted is 
that for newspapers and magazines, the tribunal regards the recreational benefit as 
being overwhelmingly dominant with only a minor deduction being granted.54 Once 
again, it appears that the tribunal proceeds to apportionment without considering the 
relevance of the overall expense. 
Self-education expenses – taxation ruling TR 98/9 
For the purposes of this article, it is the ruling’s comments on the apportionment of 
self-education expenses which serve both an income-earning purpose and a private 
purpose which are of interest. According to the ruling, if the income-earning purpose 
is merely incidental to the main private purpose, only the expenses which relate 
directly to the former purpose are allowable.55 An example of this is discussed at 
paragraphs 65 and 69. The example given clearly treats these expenses as coming 
within the first kind of apportionable outgoing referred to in Ronpibon Tin. They can 
be dissected from those expenses relating to the taxpayer’s private holiday and, as 
they can be clearly traced to the derivation of assessable income, a deduction would 
be allowable. 
The ruling also states that, if the private purpose is merely incidental to the main 
income-earning purpose, apportionment is not appropriate.56 An example is 
discussed at paragraphs 67 and 68. The example given clearly treats the relevant 
expense as potentially coming within the second kind of apportionable outgoing 
referred to in Ronpibon. The ruling acknowledges that the incidental private purpose 
does not affect the characterisation of the expense as wholly incurred in gaining 
assessable income and it is for this reason that it is not necessary to apportion. 
What is the position when a study tour or work-related conference or seminar is 
undertaken equally for income-earning purposes and private purposes? In this 
instance, can the expense be properly regarded as having been ‘wholly incurred in 
gaining assessable income’? The ruling is silent on this issue. It merely acknowledges 
                                                                
54  Case S 12 85 ATC 165, 169. 
55  TR 98/9 [17]. 
56  Ibid. 
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that where there is equality of purpose, it would be appropriate to apportion the 
expense equally between the purposes.57  
Conclusions 
The analysis conducted in this article has identified some clear principles that should 
be applied to the task of deducting dual-purpose expenses which can be linked both 
to the derivation of assessable income and to the generation of a private benefit. 
Firstly, this article argues that deductibility is a two-stage enquiry, involving 
questions of relevance and apportionment where apportionment usually follows 
relevance. The task of characterising outgoings is separate to that of apportioning 
them. The question of relevance is the threshold issue which must be first determined 
by assessing the expense as a whole. 
Parsons disagrees with the position that apportionment usually follows relevance. 
Depending on the test used to determine relevance, apportionment may not follow 
relevance. If in determining relevance we apply a ‘dominant purpose’ test, then it 
results in an ‘all or nothing’ situation and there is no need to apportion. However, if 
we apply the test from Studdert (whereby the relevance threshold is regarded as 
being satisfied by the mere co-existence of an income producing purpose with a non-
income producing purpose, regardless of whether the income producing purpose is 
dominant or not) then the analysis conducted in this article has shown that 
apportionment of the expense should follow if, as directed by section 8-1 and 
Ronpibon Tin, we are to allow a deduction which will separate out that part of the 
expense that serves the non-income producing cause.58 As mentioned above, 
however, Hill J was not called upon to expressly consider the relationship between 
relevance and apportionment in Studdert.  Parsons’ analysis would also encourage us 
to ask – does the latter approach potentially constitute an exercise in ‘partial 
relevance’? 
We are then faced with the problem of how to apportion. Ronpibon Tin confirms that 
if the expense has distinct and severable parts then the apportionment process is a 
straightforward exercise. Where the expense, however, is in the form of a single 
outlay which serves two purposes indifferently, apportionment is based on a fair and 
reasonable assessment of the extent of the relation of the outlay to assessable income. 
Parsons points out that the latter process constitutes an exercise in administrative 
difficulty which potentially expresses doubt about the relevance of an overall 
                                                                
57  Ibid [66]. 
58  See for instance Morris v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 616 [79]. 
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expense. As shown in this article, this conclusion appears to be borne out in a 
number of case and tribunal apportionment decisions. In order to avoid such an 
outcome, Parsons suggests an interpretation of Ronpibon Tin which breaks down an 
overall dual-purpose expense into either actual or hypothetical/notional outgoings 
which are in themselves relevant and deductible. There are, however, difficulties 
with this interpretation. Western Suburbs Cinemas confirms that a 
hypothetical/notional deduction is not permissible. Accordingly, Parsons’ analysis 
would encourage us to consider whether it would be preferable to apply the 
dominant purpose test with no need to apportion. 
Applying these principles to the various categories of dual-purpose outgoings 
considered in this article, separate deductible outgoings could potentially be 
identified for the home office/study, hotel/accommodation and self-education 
scenarios. It is difficult to contemplate such outgoings for the clothing, telephone 
handset/line rental and professional/recreational scenarios. For these scenarios, the 
indissectibility of the outlay and the predominance of personal use make it difficult 
to contemplate an apportionment being made to somehow identify potential separate 
payments which are in themselves relevant and deductible. For such categories of 
dual-purpose expense, this article has argued that it may be simpler to deny the 
deduction entirely and not to apportion through the application of a ‘dominant 
purpose’ approach. 
These are issues requiring further consideration and evaluation, perhaps even a 
reconsideration of Ronpibon Tin and Studdert by the High Court. In conducting this 
further evaluation, it is important to keep in mind that the problem raised by the 
apportionment process does not only concern the underlying uncertainty in the law 
and the consequential administrative difficulty for taxpayers.  In addition, the ‘partial 
relevance’ problem which the apportionment process potentially creates can have 
negative implications for the tax base. At one end, as occurred in Studdert and in Case 
R2, it seems that any amount of income producing purpose will suffice to make the 
whole amount deductible. At the other end, if we allow taxpayers to continually 
claim minor deductions for dual-purpose expenses that serve a predominantly 
private benefit and which do not pass a dominant-purpose relevance threshold, then 
the total cumulative effect of such deductions on the Revenue is likely to be 
significant over the longer term.  
These are issues requiring further consideration and evaluation, perhaps even a 
reconsideration of Ronpibon Tin by the High Court.  In conducting this further 
evaluation, it is important to keep in mind why Parsons appears to have been so keen 
to avoid the ‘partial relevance’ problem which the apportionment process potentially 
creates. Clearly, given that ‘some’ relevance can be claimed with ‘impeccable logic’, 
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in regard to almost any expense imaginable, the concept of partial relevance can have 
quite negative implications for the tax base.59 
                                                                
59  Parsons, above n 1, [5.51]. 
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